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Abstract We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule
is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of candidates: by com-
parison of worst candidates, best candidates, or by comparison based on stochastic
dominance. We perform a similar exercise for k-approval rules, where voters approve
of a fixed number k of candidates. These results can be used to compare (k-)approval
rules with respect to their manipulability. Analytical results are obtained for the case
of two voters, specifically, the values of k for which the k-approval rule is minimally
manipulable—has the smallest number of manipulable preference profiles—under the
various preference extensions are determined. For the number of voters going to infin-
ity, an asymptotic result is that the k-approval rule with k around half the number
of candidates is minimally manipulable among all scoring rules. Further results are
obtained by simulation and indicate that k-approval rules may improve on the approval
rule as far as manipulability is concerned.
1 Introduction
Approval voting was proposed by Brams and Fishburn (1983) as an alternative to
existing election systems, including positional methods, also called scoring rules. So
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far, the success of approval voting is at least mixed (cf. Brams and Fishburn 2005).
Nevertheless, it receives continued attention and is used, for instance, to select candi-
dates for councils of scientific communities such as the Society for Social Choice and
Welfare and the Game Theory Society. The interest in approval voting has recently
been confirmed by the publication of the Handbook of Approval Voting (Laslier and
Sanver 2010).
In approval voting each voter can approve of as many candidates as he wants. It is
well known (Brams and Fishburn 1983, and the references therein) that this procedure
is strategy-proof (non-manipulable) if preferences are dichotomous, that is, each voter
distinguishes only between a set of good and a set of bad candidates. With more refined
preferences, however, strategy-proofness no longer holds. More precisely, a voter will
still vote sincerely, i.e., if he approves of a candidate x then he can never do better
by not also approving of all candidates preferred to x . Such a voter, however, may
strategically approve of candidates he would not approve of absent strategic consider-
ations; or not approve of candidates he would approve of absent such considerations.
Such voting behavior goes against one of the acclaimed advantages of approval voting,
namely that voters should “[...] indicate where they would draw the line between those
[candidates] who are acceptable and those who are not” (Brams 2010).
In this paper we study the manipulability of the approval (voting) rule and of a
related procedure called k-approval (voting) rule. In a k-approval rule each voter
approves of exactly k candidates. This procedure is less flexible than the approval
rule—voters can provide less information about their preferences—but tends to be
also less manipulable, as we will argue. We explicitly use the prudent expression
‘tends to’ for several reasons. Although the paper presents complete characterizations
of the classes of manipulable preference profiles, due to combinatorial complexity
comparisons between different voting rules are still largely based on simulations, in
particular if the number of voters is larger than two. Also, our results are based on
counting (non-)manipulable preference profiles under the ‘impartial culture’ assump-
tion, and so one has to be careful in applying them to a specific real-life voting situation.
Moreover, under k-approval voting voters may be forced to vote for unacceptable can-
didates or not vote for acceptable candidates, a phenomenon which, as we have just
discussed, is regarded as strategic behavior under approval voting; on the other hand,
with k-approval voting the number of approved candidates per voter is under con-
trol (namely, fixed), as opposed to approval voting, and moreover k can be chosen
optimally in terms of non-manipulability.
An alternative voting rule, related to approval and k-approval voting, is to set an
upper bound to the number of candidates a voter may approve of. Also this rule may
be an interesting modification of approval voting, but in the present paper we choose
to compare approval voting to k-approval voting as being the positional method (scor-
ing rule in the classical sense as in Young 1975) closest in spirit to the approval
rule. A complete comparison in terms of manipulability with other scoring rules
(such as Borda count) is outside the scope of this paper.1 We do show, however, that
1 Moreover, as Saari (1990) puts it: “[...] it is possible to justify any voting method by choosing an appro-
priate measure of susceptibility [to manipulation] and imposing the appropriate assumptions on the profiles
of voters.”
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asymptotically (for large electorates) k-approval voting with k equal to half of the
number of candidates is optimal in terms of non-manipulability.
Preview of the paper In Sect. 2 we introduce the model, necessary notations, and the
approval rule and k-approval rules. We also define manipulability of these rules. For
the approval rule, this implies extending the usual preferences with a cut-off point,
indicating which candidates are acceptable and which are not. In Sects. 3 and 4 we char-
acterize the sets of non-manipulable profiles for the approval rule and for k-approval
rules, respectively. Since these rules are social choice correspondences rather than
functions (i.e., can be multi-valued, we need to make assumptions about extending
the preferences (weak orderings) of voters over candidates to sets of candidates). We
do this in three ways: by comparing the worst candidates of a set, or by comparing
the best candidates of a set, or by comparing sets on the basis of stochastic domi-
nance using equal chances. In Sect. 3 we characterize the non-manipulable preference
profiles under approval voting for worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison.
The special cases of strict preferences follow as corollaries. Strategy-proofness under
dichotomous preferences follows as a special case as well.
In Sect. 4 we characterize the non-manipulable profiles under k-approval rules,
again for worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison. We also include a brief
consideration of a lexicographic refinement of worst and best comparison. For tech-
nical reasons attention in Sect. 4 is restricted to strict preferences.
A main purpose of all these exercises is to compare the approval rule and k-approval
rules for different values of k with respect to manipulability and under different
assumptions about the voters’ preferences on sets of candidates. This comparison
is based on a simple measure, namely the number of manipulable preference profiles.
The implicit assumption is therefore that all profiles are equally likely. This is called
‘impartial culture’ in the literature. Unfortunately, a complete analytical comparison is
out of the question due to the combinatorial complexity of the problem. For this reason,
our comparative results are mainly based on simulations and, thus, they are conjectures
and suggestions rather than theorems. A selection of the results of these simulations
is presented in Sect. 7. They give rise to some prudent conclusions concerning the
manipulability of the approval and k-approval rules under different assumptions on
preference extensions. In particular, they give support to the conjecture that k-approval
rules for specific values of k may be less susceptible to manipulation than the approval
rule.
Nevertheless, we also present some analytical comparison results. In Sect. 5 we
consider the two-voter case and compute the optimal k for different preference exten-
sions, that is, the value of k for which the k-approval rule is minimally manipulable.
For k = 1, the k-approval rule is just plurality voting. In the two-voter case, this is
non-manipulable (strategy-proof) under any reasonable preference extension, includ-
ing those considered in this paper. Plurality voting, however, has a serious drawback. If
(the) two voters agree on a good second-ranked candidate but disagree on the first, then
under plurality voting this compromise is not chosen; it would be chosen, however,
under any other k-approval rule. Therefore, for each of the three mentioned preference
comparisons and for k = 1 we have established the overall optimal value of k, and
the optimal value under the restriction k ≤ m/2, where m is the total the number
of candidates. The latter restriction is justified by the desirable property of ‘citizen
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sovereignty’: for each candidate there is a preference profile resulting in that candidate
as the unique outcome. For 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2 we find k = 2 as the optimal value in case of
best or stochastic dominance comparison, and k ≈ √m in case of worst comparison.
On the other extreme, in Sect. 6 we let the number of voters go to infinity and show
that even among all scoring rules the k-approval rule with k ∈ {(m −1)/2, (m +1)/2}
if m is odd, and with k = m/2 if m is even, is minimally manipulable. Of course,
this result should be interpreted with care, since the probability of manipulability by a
single voter is very small anyway if the number of voters is large. The basic intuition
for this result is that the (statistical) variance in scores is maximal for the mentioned
value(s) of k, so that any single voter’s probability of being able to change the outcome
is minimal.
The paper is concluded by Sect. 8, in which we draw the main conclusions that can
be distilled from the results in the paper.
Further related literature In most voting situations voters have the possibility to
manipulate the outcome of the vote by not voting according to their true preferences.
The classical theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) formalizes this fact
for social choice functions, which assign a unique candidate to every preference pro-
file, but it also holds for social choice correspondences under various assumptions on
preference extensions to sets (e.g., Barberà et al. 2001). The present paper belongs to
the strand of literature, initiated by Kelly (1988, 1989), which accepts this phenome-
non as a matter of fact and looks for social choice rules which are second best in this
respect, i.e., least manipulable. Other references include Fristrup and Keiding (1998)
and Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999). Maus et al. (2007) contains a brief overview of
this literature.
Of course, counting the non-manipulable profiles is just one way of measuring the
degree of (non-)manipulability of voting rules. Many other approaches are possible
(e.g., Saari 1990, or recently Campbell and Kelly, 2008). Saari (1990) finds that for
the case of three candidates the Borda count is least ‘susceptible’ to manipulation
among all scoring rules. A direct comparison with our results is difficult since we use
a different measure of non-manipulability. In fact, for more than three alternatives
Saari’s results point in the direction of m/2-approval as the best rule, which seems in
line with our findings in spite of the differences in model specification.
In this paper we are exclusively concerned with individual manipulation. For coali-
tional manipulation see, among others, Lepelley and Mbih (1994) and, asymptotically,
Pritchard and Wilson (2009). Results of the latter paper are used in Sect. 6. This is
not surprising: the m/2-approval rule turns out to be the ‘best’ rule, at least asymp-
totically, in many different frameworks, such as indeed coalitional manipulability, but
also Condorcet efficiency, i.e, maximizing the probability of choosing a Condorcet
winner, or minimizing the probability of choosing a Condorcet loser (Gehrlein and
Lepelley 1998; Diss et al. 2010).
2 Definitions
We start with some general definitions and notations, and then introduce approval and
k-approval voting.
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2.1 General definitions
The set of voters is N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 and the (finite) set of candidates is A
with |A| = m ≥ 3.2 A preference is a weak ordering on A, i.e., a complete, reflexive,
and transitive binary relation on A. By W we denote the set of all preferences. A
preference is strict (or a linear ordering) if it is antisymmetric, i.e., it cannot contain
both (x, y) and (y, x) if x = y, for all x, y ∈ A. Let P denote the set of all strict
preferences on A.
A preference profile w is a function from N to W , i.e., an element of W N . Simi-
larly, a strict preference profile is an element of P N . For a preference profile w,w(i)
is the preference of voter i ∈ N . For a non-empty subset B of A, w(i)|B denotes the
restriction of w(i) to the set B, i.e., w(i)|B = {(x, y) ∈ B × B | (x, y) ∈ w(i)}.
Obviously, w(i)|A = w(i).
Let w be a preference profile and i ∈ N . Let 1 ≤  ≤ m and suppose there exists
a set of candidates B with |B| = , (x, y) ∈ w(i) and (y, x) /∈ w(i) for all x ∈ B
and y ∈ A \ B. Then we denote this set by β(w(i)). Observe that β(w(i)) exists if
and only if there are  candidates strictly preferred to the remaining m −  candidates
according to w(i); that is, β(w(i)) contains only complete indifference classes of
w(i).
Also, for a subset B of A, by β(w(i)|B) we denote the set of best elements of B
according to w(i), that is, β(w(i)|B) = {x ∈ B | (x, y) ∈ w(i) for all y ∈ B}.
Similarly, ω(w(i)|B) denotes the set of worst elements of B according to w(i), that is,
ω(w(i)|B) = {x ∈ B | (y, x) ∈ w(i) for all y ∈ B}. The lower contour set of a ∈ A
at w(i) is the set L(a, w(i)) = {x ∈ A | (a, x) ∈ w(i)}. Observe that a ∈ L(a, w(i))
by reflexivity of w(i).
2.2 Approval voting
In approval voting, each voter i ∈ N approves of k(i) candidates, where 1 ≤ k(i) ≤ m
is the choice of the voter. The outcome of the vote is the set of those candidates that
receive the largest number of votes.3 To formalize this, a report of voter i is a pair
r(i) = (w(i), k(i)) ∈ W × {1, . . . , m} such that βk(i)(w(i)) exists. This is then the
set of candidates approved of by voter i , and it is implied that if a voter approves
of a candidate x he also approves of all candidates which are indifferent or strictly
preferred to x according to w(i). Note that this is just a convenient way of formalizing
approval voting. By R we denote the set of all reports, and by RN the set of all (report)
profiles. We denote by
score(x, r) = |{i ∈ N | x ∈ βk(i)(w(i))}|
the number of voters who approve of candidate x ∈ A at profile r = (w, k) =
((w(i), k(i)))i∈N ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ, defined by
2 We denote the cardinality of a set D by |D|.
3 Observe that excluding k(i) = 0 is without loss of generality since the option k(i) = m is available: for
the final ranking it will not matter if a voter approves of all or of none of the candidates.
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ϕ(r) = {x ∈ A | score(x, r) ≥ score(y, r) for all y ∈ A}, r ∈ RN ,
assigns to each profile r the subset of candidates with maximal score.
We need a few more notations. For r = (w, k) ∈ RN and i ∈ N , ϕ(r−i ) denotes
the set of candidates assigned by the approval rule to the restricted profile r−i =
(r1, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rn) ∈ RN\{i}, that is,
ϕ(r−i ) = {x ∈ A | score(x, r−i ) ≥ score(y, r−i ) for all y ∈ A},
where score(x, r−i ) = |{ j ∈ N \{i} | x ∈ βk( j)(w( j))}|. Finally, for (any) a ∈ ϕ(r−i ),
ϕ−(r−i ) = {x ∈ A | score(x, r−i ) = score(a, r−i ) − 1}
is the (possibly empty) set of candidates that have score one less than those of ϕ(r−i ).
We call the candidates in ϕ(r−i ) front runners and those in ϕ−(r−i ) serious can-
didates.4 These concepts are convenient in view of the following straightforward
observation, which will be used throughout the next section:
ϕ(r) =
{
ϕ(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) if ϕ(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅,
ϕ(r−i ) ∪ [ϕ−(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i))] if ϕ(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅. (1)
In order to define (non-)manipulability of the approval rule at particular profiles
we need to be able to extend individual preferences to preferences over non-empty
subsets of candidates. For a voter i in N and a preference w(i) ∈ W , we say that
a binary relation w(i) on 2A \ {∅} extends w(i) if {x} w(i) {y} ⇔ (x, y) ∈ w(i)
holds for all x, y ∈ A. We write B w(i) C instead of (B, C) ∈w(i). Also, w(i)
and ∼w(i) denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of w(i), respectively.5
Suppose that w(i) extends w(i) for all i ∈ N . For i ∈ N and r, s ∈ RN , we say
that r and s are i-deviations if r−i = s−i . In that case, clearly, ϕ (r−i ) = ϕ (s−i ) and
ϕ− (r−i ) = ϕ− (s−i ). The approval rule ϕ is manipulable by voter i at r = (w, k)
towards (under preference extension w(i)) if r and s are i-deviations and ϕ(s) w(i)
ϕ(r). The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r if for all voters i there is no i-deviation
s such that ϕ is manipulable by i at r toward s.
A few remarks are in order here. First, if ϕ is not manipulable at profile r = (w, k)
then implicitly r is assumed to be the true profile. Thus, we assume that each voter i not
only has a true preference w(i) but also a true set βk(i)(w(i)) of candidates which he
would approve of absent any strategic considerations. This is similar to the approach
in Sanver (2010).
Second, and related, if a voter i manipulates approval voting, under any preference
extension considered in this paper he can always do so while still voting sincerely:
that is, if i approves of a candidate x , he may just as well approve of all candidates
which are at least as good as x under the true preference w(i). Hence, manipulation
4 Assuming that there is no confusion about the identity of the voter whose vote is left out.
5 In this paper we will consider (three or even more) different ways to extend w(i) over candidates to a
binary relation over non-empty sets of candidates.
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can take place by only changing the true ‘cut off’ point k(i): there is no need to
vote insincerely.6 Hence, strategic behavior under approval voting does not lead to
insincere voting (cf. Brams and Fishburn 1983), but it can lead to approval of ‘bad’
candidates or disapproval of ‘good’ candidates, where the cut-off between good and
bad is determined by the true number k(i).
We conclude this section with a few examples of manipulation of the approval vot-
ing rule. These examples illustrate the different preference extensions to be considered
later on in the paper.
Example 2.1 There are six voters (1, . . . , 6) and four candidates a, b, c, d. We con-
sider manipulation by voter 1 and under the approval voting rule it is sufficient to
know the total votes cast by the other voters.
• Assume that the votes from 2, . . . , 6 add up to 4, 4, 3, 2 for a, b, c, d, respectively.
If voter 1 has preference cab|d (meaning that he (strictly) prefers c over a over b
over d and finds the first three acceptable—so k(1) = 3 in the notation introduced
above), then truthful voting results in the winning set {a, b}. If 1 votes only for
a and c then the winning set is {a}, which is better than {a, b} both by compar-
ing the worst elements, and by stochastic comparison: the latter means that if {a}
is identified with the lottery assigning probability 1 to a, and {a, b} with lottery
assigning equal chances to a and b, then the first lottery stochastically dominates
the second. If 1 votes only for c then the winning set is {a, b, c}, which is better
by best comparison, i.e., has the best top element.
• Now the votes cast by 2, . . . , 6 add up to 2, 4, 2, 4 for a, b, c, d, respectively, and
voter 1 has preference ca|bd. Truthful voting results in {b, d}. Voting for b, a and
c results in {b}, which is better by worst and stochastic comparison.
• Finally, the votes cast by 2, . . . , 6 add up to 3, 4, 2, 2 for a, b, c, d, respectively,
and voter 1 has preference c|abd. Truthful voting results in {b}. Voting for a and
c results in {a, b}, which is better by best comparison.
Observe that in all these examples voter 1 still votes sincerely, even if he manipu-
lates. This means that he still votes for a top ranked set of candidates. Nevertheless,
he may sometimes not vote for a candidate even if he finds that candidate acceptable,
or vote for a candidate even if he finds that candidate not acceptable.
2.3 k-Approval voting
A variation on approval voting is obtained by fixing the number of candidates that has
to be approved by each voter. Specifically, for a profile p ∈ P N of strict preferences,
a candidate x ∈ A, and a number k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, we denote by the k-score
scorek(x, p) = |{i ∈ N | x ∈ βk(p(i))}|
the total number of voters for who candidate x is among the k first ranked candidates
at a profile p. The k-approval rule ϕk , defined by
6 We leave it to the reader to verify this claim.
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ϕk(p) = {x ∈ A | scorek(x, p) ≥ scorek(y, p) for all y ∈ A}, p ∈ P N
assigns to each profile p the subset of candidates with maximal k-score.7
Observe that it is, indeed, convenient to restrict attention to strict preferences, since
otherwise we might have to split up indifference classes due to the fact that the number
of candidates to be approved is now fixed.
The sets ϕk(p−i ) and ϕ−k (p−i ) of front runners and serious candidates are defined




ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) if ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅,
ϕk(p−i ) ∪
[
ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))
]
if ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅, (2)
for all p ∈ P N , i ∈ N , and 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1.
The definitions of (non)-manipulability of ϕk at a profile p are completely analo-
gous to those for the approval rule. In contrast to approval voting, k-approval voting
may lead to insincere voting since the number of candidates that can be approved of
is now fixed.
3 Manipulability of approval voting
The purpose of this section is to characterize the (report) profiles at which the approval
rule is not manipulable, for three different preference extensions. For the purpose of
later comparison with k-approval voting we also consider (non-)manipulability under
strict preferences. Moreover, we conclude with a brief consideration of dichotomous
preferences.
3.1 Worst comparison
In this section we extend preferences to sets by considering worst candidates of those
sets. Let i ∈ N and w(i) ∈ W , then we define the extension w(i) by




and y ∈ ω (w(i)|C)
for all non-empty sets B, C ⊆ A. Thus, B is weakly preferred to C whenever every
worst candidate of B is (weakly) preferred, according to w(i), to every worst candidate
of C .
Theorem 3.1 Let r = (w, k) ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r
under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following
two statements holds:
7 Unlike the approval rule the k-approval rule is a scoring rule in the classical meaning of the word, as in
Young (1975); see Sect. 6. Note, further, that the case k = m is uninteresting.
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(a) ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ and {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i ) ∩
βk(i) (w (i)).
(b) {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i ).
In words, condition (a) requires that if among the front runners there are candidates
belonging to the k(i) highest ranked candidates of voter i , then i is indifferent between
those candidates; and (b) requires that voter i is indifferent between all front runners.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r .
In case (a), it follows by (1) that ϕ (r) = ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)). By the assump-
tion in (a), ϕ (r) = β (w (i) |ϕ(r−i )). Again by (1), ϕ (s) ∩ ϕ (r−i ) = ∅, so for every
x ∈ ϕ(r) = β (w (i) |ϕ(r−i )) it follows that {x} w(i) ϕ (s). So, ϕ (r) w(i) ϕ (s).
Now consider case (b) and assume ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ otherwise we are
done by (a). Then ϕ(r−i ) ⊆ ϕ(r), so we have ω
(
w(i)|ϕ(r)
) = ϕ(r−i ). Since, by (1),
ϕ (s) ∩ ϕ (r−i ) = ∅, we have again ϕ (r) w(i) ϕ (s).
For the only if-part, suppose that there is an voter i for whom (a) nor (b) holds. It is
sufficient to prove that ϕ is manipulable at profile r by voter i . Observe that either there
exist x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i )∩βk(i)(w (i)) such that {x} w(i) {y}, or ϕ (r−i )∩βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅
and there exist x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i ) such that {x} w(i) {y}. In both cases, by (1), x, y ∈
ϕ (r). Now consider the report s (i) = (w′ (i) , 1) of voter i such that β (w′ (i)) = {x}.
Then, by (1) again, ϕ (s) = {x} w(i) ϕ (r). unionsq
We now consider the subclass of strict preferences. This will enable us to compare
approval voting to k-approval voting, which is studied in the next section.
3.1.1 Strict preferences
The following result considers manipulability of the approval rule ϕ when preferences
are strict. Let SN denote the set of all reports (w, k) ∈ RN such that w ∈ P N .
Corollary 3.2 Let r = (w, k) ∈ SN . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to SN , is not
manipulable at r under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one
of the following two statements holds:
(a) |ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) | = 1.
(b) |ϕ (r−i )| = 1.
Proof For the only-if direction, note that if voter i can manipulate via a preference in
W , then i can also manipulate by a strict preference, by strictifying the weak prefer-
ence in any arbitrary way. Thus, the only-if direction follows from Theorem 3.1. The
if-direction is immediate from Theorem 3.1. unionsq
3.2 Best comparison
In this section we extend preferences to sets by considering best candidates of those
sets. Let i ∈ N and w(i) ∈ W , then we define the extension w(i) by8
8 In order to avoid cumbersome notation we will use the same symbols for different preference extensions
in this paper.
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and y ∈ β (w(i)|C)
for all non-empty sets B, C ⊆ A. Thus, B is weakly preferred to C whenever every
best candidate of B is (weakly) preferred, according to w(i), to every best candidate
of C .
Theorem 3.3 Let r = (w, k) ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r
under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following two
statements holds:
(a) (x, y) ∈ w(i) for all x ∈ β (w(i)|ϕ(r−i )) and all y ∈ ϕ−(r−i ).
(b) ϕ(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅.
In words, condition (a) requires that any best candidate among the front runners is
preferred by i over all serious candidates; and (b) requires that none of the front run-
ners is among his k (i) highest ranked candidates, but some of the serious candidates
are among his k (i) highest ranked candidates.
Proof of Theorem 3.3 For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r .
In case (a), it follows by (1) that there exists x ∈ ϕ(r) with x ∈ β (w(i)|ϕ(r−i )). So
by (a), {x} w(i) {y} for all y ∈ ϕ(r−i ) ∪ ϕ−(r−i ). This implies ϕ (r) w(i) ϕ (s).
In case (b), by (1), ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i ) ∪
[
ϕ−(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i))
]
. So ϕ(r) w(i) {x}
for all x ∈ ϕ(r−i ) ∪ ϕ−(r−i ). This implies again ϕ (r) w(i) ϕ (s).
For the only if-part, suppose that there is an voter i for whom (a) nor (b) holds.
It is sufficient to prove that ϕ is manipulable at profile r by voter i . Observe that





; or (ii) ϕ−(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅ and there exists y ∈ ϕ−(r−i ) such




. Note that, in both cases, ϕ(r) ⊆ ϕ(r−i ). For both cases,
consider the report s (i) = (w′ (i) , 1) of voter i such that β (w′ (i)) = {y}. Then by
(1), ϕ (s) = ϕ(r−i ) ∪ {y}, which implies ϕ (s) w(i) ϕ (r). unionsq
For strict preferences we have the following corollary. The proof is straightforward
and therefore omitted.
Corollary 3.4 Let r = (w, k) ∈ SN . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to SN , is not
manipulable at r under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of
the following two statements holds:





(b) ϕ(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅.
3.3 Stochastic dominance comparison
In this section comparisons of sets of candidates are based on stochastic dominance.
To formalize this we need some further notions. Let u be a function from A to R.
Then u is said to be a utility function representing preference w(i) of voter i , if for all
candidates x and y in A
(x, y) ∈ w(i) if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y).
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Let B and C be two nonempty subsets of candidates. Voter i is said to prefer B to C








|C | u (a) for every utility function u representing w (i) .
This preference extension9 is based on the idea that, if we attach equal probabilities
to the candidates in each set, then the expected utility of the resulting lottery over
B should be at least as high as the expected utility of the resulting lottery over C ,
for each utility function representing p(i). Clearly, and in contrast to worst and best
comparison in the preceding sections, this preference extension is not complete: many
sets are incomparable. Observe that our notion of manipulability implies that a voter
manages to obtain a preferred and thus comparable set.
In the following theorem we characterize the non-manipulable profiles under the
stochastic dominance preference extension. To understand the proof, it is sometimes
convenient to keep in mind the familiar characterization (or definition) of stochastic
dominance involving only probabilities. This characterization says that a lottery  is
preferred over another lottery ′ if it can be obtained by shifting probability in ′ to
preferred candidates.
Theorem 3.5 Let r = (w, k) ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r
under stochastic dominance if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following
three statements holds:
(a) ϕ (r−i ) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and ϕ− (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅.
(b) ϕ (r−i )∩βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ and {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i )∩βk(i) (w (i))
and [A\βk(i) (w (i))] ∩ ϕ (r−i ) = ∅.
(c) {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i ) and ϕ− (r−i ) ⊆ L (x, w (i)) for some
x ∈ ϕ (r−i ).
In words, these three cases can be described as follows. In case (a), no front runner
but at least one serious candidate belongs to the k(i) highest ranked candidates. In
case (b) there are front runners among the k (i) highest ranked candidates and voter i
is indifferent between them, but there are also lower ranked front runners. In case (c)
voter i is indifferent between the front runners, and all serious candidates are lower
ranked than some of the front runners.
For a proof of this theorem see the Appendix.
The following corollary (proof omitted) applies to strict preferences.
Corollary 3.6 Let r = (w, k) ∈ SN . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to SN , is not
manipulable at r under stochastic dominance comparison if and only if for each voter
i at least one of the following three statements holds:
(a) ϕ (r−i ) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and ϕ− (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅.
(b) ϕ (r−i )∩βk(i) (w (i)) = {x} for some x ∈ A and [A\βk(i) (w (i))] ∩ ϕ (r−i ) = ∅.
(c) ϕ (r−i ) = {x} for some x ∈ A and ϕ− (r−i ) ⊆ L (x, w (i)) .
9 The stochastic dominance criterion to compare sets has been used before, see e.g. Barberà et al. (2001).
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3.4 Dichotomous preferences
A preference w(i) ∈ W is dichotomous if it has two indifference classes, i.e., there are
disjoint subsets B1 = ∅ and B2 of A such that A = B1 ∪ B2, (x, y), (y, x) ∈ w(i) for
all x, y ∈ B1 and for all x, y ∈ B2, and (x, y) ∈ w(i), (y, x) /∈ w(i) for all x ∈ B1
and y ∈ B2. Let D ⊆ W denote the subset of all dichotomous preferences. A report
r(i) = (w(i), k(i)) is in Rd if w(i) is dichotomous and k(i) is the cardinality of the
higher indifference class of w(i), i.e., k(i) = |B1| in the notation above.10 A report
r(i) ∈ Rd is called dichotomous as well. In the following corollary we show that the
approval rule is strategy-proof when restricted to dichotomous report profiles, under
all three preference extensions considered in this paper: this means that ϕ is manipu-
lable at no r ∈ RNd under any of these preference extensions. This result confirms well
known results on approval voting, see Brams and Fishburn (1983) and the references
therein. For completeness, a proof based on the earlier results in this section is given
in the Appendix.
Corollary 3.7 The approval ruleϕ, restricted to RNd , is strategy-proof under the worst,
best, and stochastic dominance preference extensions.
4 Manipulability of k-approval voting
In this section we characterize the profiles of preferences at which the k-approval rule
is not manipulable for different preference extensions, starting with worst, best, and
stochastic dominance comparison.
4.1 Worst comparison
For the definition of the worst comparison preference extension see Sect. 3.1.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule is not
manipulable under worst comparison.
Theorem 4.1 Let p ∈ P N . The k-approval rule ϕk is not manipulable at p under
worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following three
statements holds:
(a) |ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))| = 1.
(b) |ϕk(p−i )| = 1.
(c) A \ βk(p(i))  ϕk(p−i ).
In words, condition (a) requires that exactly one of that voter i’s k highest ranked
candidates is a front runner; (b) requires that there is a unique front runner; and (c)
requires that the front runners are a strict subset of the m −k lowest ranked candidates.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 For the if-part, let i ∈ N and let q be an i-deviation of p.
Assume that at least one of the cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. We show that voter i
cannot manipulate from p to q.
10 Observe that, in this case, k(i) is uniquely determined by w(i).
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In case (a), let {x} = ϕk(p−i )∩βk(p(i)). By (2), ϕk(p) = {x}. Again by (2), either
ϕk(q) ⊆ ϕk(p−i ) or ϕk(p−i ) ⊆ ϕk(q). In the first case, if x ∈ ϕk(q), then ϕk(p) =
{x} p(i) ϕk(q); if x /∈ ϕk(q) then ϕk(q) ⊆ A \ βk(p(i)) so that again ϕk(p) =
{x} p(i) ϕk(q). In the second case, ϕk(p) = {x} ⊆ ϕk(q), hence ϕk(p) p(i) ϕk(q).
In case (b), let ϕk(p−i ) = {x} for some candidate x . If x ∈ βk(p(i)) we are
done by case (a). If x /∈ βk(p(i)) then by (2), ϕk(p) = {x} ∪
[
ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))
]
and, thus, ω(p(i)|ϕk (p)) = x . Further, also by (2), ϕk(q) = {x} or ϕk(q) = {x} ∪[
ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i))
]
; in both cases, (x, ω(p(i)|ϕk (q))) ∈ p(i) and, thus, ϕk(p) p(i)
ϕk(q).
In case (c), by (2) we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) and ϕk(q) = ϕk(q−i ) ∩
βk(q(i)) = ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i)). If βk(q(i)) = βk(p(i)) then ϕk(p) = ϕk(q). Other-
wise, since A \ βk(p(i))  ϕk(p−i ), there is a y ∈ [A \ βk(p(i))] ∩ ϕk(q). Hence,
ϕk(p) p(i) ϕk(q).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of the three
cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕk is manipulable at profile p
by voter i . For this, in turn, it is sufficient to prove that i can manipulate at profile p
for the following two cases.
Case (i): ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ and |ϕk(p−i )| ≥ 2.
Let b = β (p(i)|ϕk (p−i )). Take q(i) such that the positions in p(i) of b
and one of the candidates in βk(p(i)) are swapped. Then ϕk(q) = {b}
and ϕk(q) p(i) ϕk(p), hence voter i can manipulate at profile p toward
q.
Case (ii): |ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))| ≥ 2 and [A \ βk(p(i))]  ϕk(p−i ).
Let w = ω (p(i)|ϕk (p−i )∩βk (p(i))) and y ∈ A \ [βk(p(i)) ∪ ϕk(p−i )].
Let q(i) be obtained from p(i) by swapping the positions of the can-
didates w and y. By (2), ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) and ϕk(q) =
ϕk(p−i )∩βk(p(i)) \ {w} it follows that ϕk(q) p(i) ϕk(p), proving that
ϕk is manipulable by voter i at profile p toward q.
unionsq
4.2 Best comparison
For the definition of the best comparison preference extension see Sect. 3.2.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule is not
manipulable under best comparison.
Theorem 4.2 Let p ∈ P N . The k-approval scoring rule ϕk is not manipulable at p
under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following three
statements holds:
(a) (β(p(i)|ϕk (p−i )), x) ∈ p(i) for all x ∈ ϕ−k (p−i ).
(b) ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
(c) |ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))| > |A \ [βk(p(i)) ∪ ϕk(p−i )]|.
In words, condition (a) requires that the best candidate among the front runners is
preferred over all serious candidates; (b) requires that no front runner is among his k
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first ranked candidates, but some of the serious candidates are; and (c) requires that the
number of the voter’s k highest ranked candidates among the front runners is larger
than the number of candidates that are neither among his k highest ranked nor among
the front runners.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 For the if-part, let q be an i-deviation of p. Note that
ϕk(p−i ) = ϕk(q−i ) and ϕ−k (p−i ) = ϕ−k (q−i ). Assume that at least one of the cases
(a), (b), and (c) holds. We show that voter i cannot manipulate from p to q.








) ∈ ϕk(p−i ) ∪ ϕ−k (p−i ) and by the assumption
for case (a), we conclude that ϕk(p) p(i) ϕk(q).




) = β (p(i)|ϕ−k (p−i )∩βk (p(i))
)
; and ϕk(q) ∈ ϕk(p−i )∪ [ϕ−k (p−i )∩
βk(q(i))]. By the assumptions for this case, ϕk(p) p(i) ϕk(q).
In case (c), it is easy to see that |A\ϕk(p−i )| < |βk(p(i))| = k = |βk(q(i))|, hence
βk(q(i)) ∩ ϕk(p−i ) = ∅. Therefore, by (2) we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) and
ϕk(q) = ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i)) ⊆ ϕk(p−i ). Thus, also in this case ϕk(p) p(i) ϕk(q).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of the three
cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕk is manipulable at profile p
by voter i . For this, in turn, it is sufficient to prove that i can manipulate at profile p
for the following two cases.
Case (i): There is an x ∈ ϕ−k (p−i ) such that (x, b) ∈ p(i), where b = β (ϕk(p−i ),
p(i)|ϕk(p−i )
)
; ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅; and |ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))| ≤
|A \ [βk(p(i)) ∪ ϕk(p−i )]|.
For this case, note that x ∈ βk(p(i)). By the assumptions for this case
we can take a q(i) ∈ P with x ∈ βk(q(i)) and ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i)) = ∅.
Hence, x ∈ ϕk(q) \ϕk(p) and, thus, ϕk(q) p(i) ϕk(p). So i can manip-
ulate at profile p toward q.





; and ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
In this case, ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i ). Note that the sets βk(p(i)), ϕk(p−i ),
and ϕ−k (p−i ) are pairwise disjoint. So we can take q(i) ∈ P such that
x ∈ βk(q(i)) and ϕk(p−i )∩βk(q(i)) = ∅. Then ϕk(q) ⊇ ϕk(p−i )∪{x},
so x ∈ ϕk(q) \ ϕk(p), thus ϕk(q) p(i) ϕk(p) and i can manipulate at
profile p toward q. unionsq
4.3 Stochastic dominance comparison
For the definition of the stochastic dominance comparison preference extension see
Sect. 3.3.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule is
not manipulable under stochastic dominance comparison. Its proof is placed in the
Appendix.
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Theorem 4.3 Let p ∈ P N . The k-approval scoring rule ϕk is not manipulable at p
under stochastic dominance comparison if and only if for all voters i at least one of
the following five statements holds:
(a) A \ βk(p(i))  ϕk(p−i ).
(b) ϕk(p−i ) ⊆ [A \ βk(p(i))] and ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
(c) ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = {w} for some w ∈ A and [A \ βk(p(i))] ∩ ϕk(p−i ) = ∅.
(d) ϕk(p−i ) = {w} for some w ∈ A and ϕ−k (p−i ) ⊆ L(w, p(i)).
(e) ϕk(p−i ) = {w} for some w ∈ A and |ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ L(w, p(i))| > m − k.
In words, these five cases can be described as follows. In case (a), at least one of
voter i’s k highest ranked candidates and all of his lower ranked candidates are front
runners. In case (b), no front runner but at least one serious candidate is among his k
highest ranked candidates. In case (c) there is a unique front runner among voter i’s
k highest ranked candidates, but there are lower ranked front runners as well. In case
(d) there is a unique front runner, which is preferred by i to all serious candidates. In
case (e) there is again a unique front runner, and among the serious candidates there
are more than m − k candidates worse than the unique front runner.
5 k-Approval voting: the two-voter case
In this section we concentrate on the two-voter case and on k-approval voting. We
consider the following question: which k-approval rule is least (or minimally) manip-
ulable, under various assumptions on preference extensions as studied in the preceding
sections? Answering this question for more than two voters is combinatorially com-
plex, and will be limited to simulation results in Sect. 7; those results also extend to
approval voting, including the two-voter case.
We start with a simple theorem, which will be derived from Theorems 4.1, 4.2,
and 4.3, but also easily follows directly. It states that ϕ1 is strategy-proof, i.e., not
manipulable at any profile p.
Theorem 5.1 Let n = 2. Then the 1-approval rule ϕ1 is strategy-proof under worst,
best, and stochastic dominance comparison.
Proof Let p = (p(1), p(2)) be a preference profile and let k = 1. Note that (b) in The-
orem 4.1 is always satisfied: this shows strategy-proofness under worst comparison.
In Theorem 4.2, (a) reduces to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) and (b) to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)): this
shows strategy-proofness under best comparison. Finally, in Theorem 4.3, (b) reduces
to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) and (d) to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)): this shows strategy-proofness
under stochastic dominance comparison. unionsq
This observation might make our quest for minimally manipulable rules futile, were
it not the case that the 1-approval rule (i.e., plurality rule) is not unambiguously attrac-
tive. As an example, consider the case where voter 1 has preference p(1) : xz . . . y
and voter 2 has preference p(2) : yz . . . x (notations obvious). Then ϕ1(p) = {x, y}
but ϕ2(p) = {z}. So it seems that ϕ2 offers a better compromise in this case than ϕ1.
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Moreover, for more than two voters and apart from a few particular cases, Theorem
5.1 no longer holds.
We consider the three cases (worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison)
separately, in the next three subsections. In a fourth subsection, we consider two further
preference extensions—lexicographic worst and best comparison—for the two-voter
case.
5.1 Worst comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under worst comparison are easily de-
scribed using Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 5.2 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider worst comparison.
(a) If k ≤ (m + 1)/2, then ϕk is not manipulable at p if and only if |ϕk(p)| = 1, or
equivalently,
|βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 1.
(b) If k > (m+1)/2, then ϕk is not manipulable at p if and only if |ϕk(p)| = 2k−m,
or equivalently,
|βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 2k − m.
Proof Case (b) in Theorem 4.1 does not apply. If case (a) in Theorem 4.1 applies
then we have |βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 1 (or, equivalently, |ϕk(p)| = 1), but this is
possible if and only if k ≤ (m + 1)/2. If case (c) in Theorem 4.1 applies then we have
|βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 2k − m (or, equivalently, |ϕk(p)| = 2k − m), but this is
possible if and only if k ≥ (m + 1)/2; but for k = (m + 1)/2 we have 2k − m = 1,
so that we are back in case (a). unionsq
Denote by η(m, k) the number of profiles (for two voters) at which ϕk is not manip-
ulable. By straightforward counting we obtain the following result for the number of
manipulable profiles for two voters under worst comparison.
Theorem 5.3 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Consider worst comparison. Then
η(m, k) =
{
m! k (m−kk−1)k! (m − k)! if k ≤ (m + 1)/2
m! ( k2k−m)k! (m − k)! if k > (m + 1)/2.
From this theorem we derive the following corollary (see the Appendix for a proof),
which states some facts about k as far as non-manipulability is concerned.
Corollary 5.4 (a) η(m, k) increases in k between 2 and an integer k∗, which is
close11 to
√
m, and decreases between k∗ and 12 (m − 1).
11 The exact meaning of k∗ being close to √m in part (a) is explained in the proof.
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(b) η(m, k) increases between 12 (m − 1) and (m − 1).(c) The (m −1)-approval scoring rule is second best since η(m, (m −1)) > η(m, k)
for all m − 1 > k ≥ 2.
The first-best value of k is k = 1 (Theorem 5.1), but ϕ1 has the drawback that it
does not give much opportunity for compromises. Among other values of k, the value
k = m −1 is best. We might, however, prefer to have k ≤ (m +1)/2, for the following
reason. Call ϕk citizen-sovereign if for every candidate x ∈ A there is a profile p ∈ P
with ϕk(p) = {x}. It is not difficult to see that ϕk is citizen-sovereign for any number
of voters n ≥ 2 if k ≤ (m + 1)/2. For n = 2 and k > (m + 1)/2, however, ϕk is
not citizen-sovereign. Hence, if we restrict ourselves to citizen-sovereign rules with
k ≥ 2, then the best rule is ϕk∗ , where k∗ is close to √m.
5.2 Best comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under best comparison can be derived
from Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 5.5 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider best comparison.
(a) If k ≤ m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at p ∈ P if and only if either
β(p(1)) ∈ βk(p(2)) and β(p(2)) ∈ βk(p(1))
or
βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) = ∅.
(b) If k > m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at any p ∈ P.
Proof If k > m/2 then case (c) in Theorem 4.2 applies to all p ∈ P , and if k ≤ m/2
then case (c) applies to no p ∈ P . This implies part (b) of the corollary, and it also
implies that for k ≤ m/2 we only have to consider cases (a) and (b) in Theorem 4.2.
It is easily seen that these cases result in the two cases in part (a) of the corollary. unionsq
The number of non-manipulable profiles η(m, k) if k ≤ m/2 is computed in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.6 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2. Consider best comparison. Then
η(m, k) = m! (m − 2)! (k − 1)2 + m! (m − 1)! + m! [(m − k)!]2/(m − 2k)!.
Proof The first case in (a) in Corollary 5.5 with β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) results in





(k − 1)! (m − k)!
different non-manipulable profiles. This yields the first term of η(m, k) in the theorem.
If β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) then this number is simply equal to m! (m − 1)!, which yields
the second term. The second case in (a) in Corollary 5.5 results in
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k! (m − k)!
different non-manipulable profiles, which simplifies to the third term for η(m, k) in
the theorem. unionsq
If we require k = 1 and citizen-sovereignty, i.e., k ≤ m/2, then the optimal value
of k with respect to non-manipulability, i.e., the value of k that maximizes η(m, k), is
equal to 2.
To see this, note that by Theorem 5.6 and some elementary calculations we have
for 2 < k ≤ m2 :
η(m, 2) > η(m, k)
⇔ (m − 2)(m − 3) > k(k − 2) +
k factors︷ ︸︸ ︷
(m − k)(m − k − 1) · · · · · (m − 2k + 1)
(m − 2)(m − 3) · · · · · (m − k + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−2 factors
.
Since k > 2 it is therefore sufficient to prove that
(m − 2)(m − 3) > k(k − 2) + (m − 2k + 2)(m − 2k + 1).
This simplifies to (4k − 8)m > 5k2 − 8k − 4. Since m ≥ 2k, it is sufficient to show
that 3k2 − 8k + 4 > 0, which indeed holds for k > 2.
5.3 Stochastic dominance comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under stochastic dominance comparison
can be derived from Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 5.7 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider stochastic domi-
nance comparison. Then ϕk is not manipulable at p if and only if at least one of the
following holds.
(a) βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) = ∅.
(b) |βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 1.
(c) βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) = ∅ and [A \ βk(p(1))] ∩ [A \ βk(p(2))] = ∅.
Proof For n = 2 and k ≥ 2 cases (d) and (e) in Theorem 4.3 are not possible. Case
(c) in Theorem 4.3 reduces to case (b) above, and case (a) in Theorem 4.3 reduces to
case (c) above. Finally, case (b) in the theorem reduces to case (a) above. unionsq
From this description we can again derive the number of manipulable profiles
η(m, k).
Theorem 5.8 Let n = 2, k ≥ 2, and consider stochastic dominance comparison.
(a) If k ≤ m/2 then
η(m, k) = m! [(m − k)!]2/(m − 2k)! + m! k2 [(m − k)!]2/(m − 2k + 1)!.
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(b) If k > m/2 then
η(m, k) = m! [k!]2/(2k − m)!.
Proof If k ≤ m/2 then (c) in Corollary 5.7 is not possible, and cases (a) and (b) in the






k! (m − k)!







k! (m − k)!
non-manipulable profiles, resulting in the second term for η(m, k).
If k > m/2 then case (a) of Corollary 5.7 is not possible, and (b) is a special case
of (c). For the latter case, we just have to count the number of profiles for which
[A \ βk(p(1))] ∩ [A \ βk(p(2))] = ∅, since the other condition is always fulfilled.






k! (m − k)!
which is equal to m! [k!]2/(2k − m)! . unionsq
About the value of k that maximizes η(m, k), so the value of k that is optimal with
respect to non-manipulability, we can say the following.
1. For 2 ≤ k ≤ m2 , the number of non-manipulable profiles decreases with k, and
thus k = 2 is optimal.
2. For m2 < k ≤ m − 1, the number of non-manipulable profiles increases with k,
and thus k = m − 1 is optimal.
3. η(m, 2) > η(m, m − 1) for m ≥ 4, so k = 2 is the overall optimal value between
2 and m − 1.
To prove these statements, first assume k ≤ m2 . Then, using Theorem 5.8(a) and
simplifying, we derive
η(m, k + 1) < η(m, k) ⇔ 3k2 − 2km − 1 < 0,
and it is easily seen that the right hand side holds for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m2 . Next, assume
m
2 < k ≤ m − 1. Then, using Theorem 5.8(b) and simplifying, we derive
η(m, k + 1) > η(m, k) ⇔ 3k2 + k(4 − 4m) + m2 − 3m + 1 < 0.
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m2 + m + 1; the smaller root is smaller than m2 , whereas the larger root is larger
than m−1. Thus, the right hand side holds for all m2 < k ≤ m−1. Finally, by Theorem
5.8 again,
η(m, 2) > η(m, m − 1) ⇔ m > 3,
so that k = 2 is the overall optimal value of k for 2 ≤ k ≤ m − 1.
5.4 Lexicographic worst and best comparison
In this section we briefly consider a natural extension of worst and best comparison,
namely lexicographic worst and best comparison. These preference extensions to sets
are given by the following recursive definition. For two subsets B and C of candidates,
we say that B is (weakly) preferred to C under lexicographic worst comparison by
voter i with preference p(i) if
1. C = ∅, or
2. B and C are non-empty and
(
ω(p(i)|B), ω(p(i)|C )
) ∈ p(i), or
3. ω(p(i)|B) = ω(p(i)|C ) =: w and B \ {w} is preferred to C \ {w} under lexico-
graphic worst comparison by voter i with preference p(i).
The definition for lexicographic best comparison is obtained by replacing the worst
candidate by the best candidate, i.e., by replacing ω(·) by β(·). Thus, under lexico-
graphic worst comparison a voter first considers the worst elements of B and C . If
these are different, then he prefers the set with the better worst element. Otherwise,
the voter considers the second worst elements. If these are different, then he prefers
the set with the better second worst element. Otherwise, he considers the third worst
elements, etc. Similarly for lexicographic best comparison.
Complete characterizations of the non-manipulable profiles for both lexicographic
worst and lexicographic best comparison for arbitrary n can be given but are rather
technical (even more so than for stochastic dominance comparison) and therefore not
included.
Note that any profile that is manipulable under worst [best] comparison is also
manipulable under lexicographic worst [best] comparison. Hence, the set of non-
manipulable profiles under lexicographic worst [best] comparison is always a subset
of the set of non-manipulable profiles under worst [best] comparison. It is not very
difficult to check (we omit the proof for the sake of briefness) that all the profiles
listed in Corollary 5.2, that is, all two-voter profiles that are non-manipulable under
worst comparison, are also non-manipulable under lexicographic worst comparison,
so that in this case considering lexicographic worst comparison instead of just worst
comparison does not make any difference. The non-manipulable profiles coincide,
and the optimal value of k as far as non-manipulability is concerned, is the same as in
Sect. 5.1.
For two voters and lexicographic best comparison the situation is different and the
set of non-manipulable profiles is a strict subset of the set of non-manipulable profiles
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under best comparison, that is, the set of profiles described in Corollary 5.5. To be
precise, we have the following result, which can be derived from Corollary 5.5 (the
proof is again left to the reader).
Corollary 5.9 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider lexicographic best
comparison.
(a) If k ≤ m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at p ∈ P if and only if either
{β(p(1))} = {β(p(2))} = βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(1))
or
βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) = ∅.
(b) If k > m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at any p ∈ P.
In this case, the total number of non-manipulable profiles for 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2 is equal
to
η(m, k) = m! [(m − k)!]
2 (m − 2k + 2)
(m − 2k + 1)!
and this number is decreasing in k, so that k = 2 is the value of k that minimizes
manipulability subject to 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2, just as in the best comparison case. The
proofs of these facts are somewhat simpler than for the best comparison case. For the
sake of briefness we omit them.
6 An asymptotic result
We start with defining the class of all scoring rules. A (normalized) scoring vector is a
vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ Rm with 1 = s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm = 0. For a preference
π ∈ P and a candidate x ∈ A let t (π, x) denote the rank of x in the preference π , i.e.,
t (π, x) = k where k = 1 if {x} = β(π) and {x} = βk(π) \ βk−1(π) otherwise.






the total score that x obtains under profile p and score vector s. The scoring rule with
scoring vector s is defined by
ϕs(p) = {x ∈ A | scores(x, p) ≥ scores(y, p) for all y ∈ A}, p ∈ P N .
Clearly, a k-approval rule is a scoring rule with scoring vector s such that s1 = · · · =
sk = 1 and sk+1 = · · · = sm = 0.
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Now, in what follows, we fix the number of candidates m and let the number of
voters go to infinity. We will show, formally, that then any two scoring rules lead to
the same expected values of the highest score, second highest score, and so on, up to
a multiplicative constant proportional to the standard deviations of the scoring vec-
tors: the higher this standard deviation the larger the differences between the expected
scores. Since the standard deviation is maximal for k-approval rules with k around
m/2, we can conclude by the law of large numbers that the proportion of manipulable
profiles is smallest for this rule.12
In order to derive the announced result, assume that voter preferences are drawn
from the uniform distribution over P—that is, according to ‘impartial culture’. Let
Y = (Yπ )π∈P denote the random vector giving the numbers of voters for each prefer-
ence (so ∑π∈P Yπ = n). Then Y has a multinomial distribution with mean (n/m!)1,
where 1 is a vector with all entries equal to 1. Write A = {x1, . . . , xm}, then for a
scoring vector s the random vector Y gives rise to a random vector of scores Xs =
(Xs1, . . . , X
s
m) where Xsj =
∑
π∈P Yπ st (π,x j ) for j = 1, . . . , m. Let
σ(s) =
√
s21 + · · · + s2m
m
− s¯2
denote the standard deviation of the scoring vector s, where s¯ = (s1 + · · · + sm)/m
is the mean of s. Proposition 2 in Pritchard and Wilson (2009) asserts that (Xs −
ns¯1)/
√





(Z − Z¯1), where Z =
(Z1, . . . , Zm) is a vector of independent standard normal random variables and Z¯ =
(1/m)
∑m
j=1 Z j . In words, this means that the limit distributions of the vectors of nor-
malized random variables Xs differ only in a multiplicative constant, namely the stan-
dard deviation σ(s). This implies Zs = (σ (s)/σ (s′))Zs′ for any two scoring vectors s
and s′. In particular, this also holds for the associated order statistics (Zs(1), . . . , Z
s
(m))






(1) being the (limit) distributions of the highest
scores. As a consequence we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1 For all scoring vectors s and s′,
E[Zs( j)] − E[Zs( j+1)] = (σ (s)/σ (s′))
(




for all j = 1, . . . , m − 1, where E denotes the expectation operator.
Proposition 6.1 implies that the difference in expected value between any two con-
secutive scores is largest for rules based on scoring vectors with maximal standard
deviation. Since the vectors of random variables Zs have the same distributions up to
these standard deviations of the score vectors, and taking into account that the prob-
ability of all candidates having distinct scores converges to 1 if the number of voters
12 We thank Eric Beutner (Maastricht University) for helpful discussions on this topic.
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goes to infinity,13 we have by the law of large numbers that scoring rules ϕs with maxi-
mal standard deviation σ(s) have the smallest proportion of manipulable profiles. The
following result, of which for completeness a proof is given in the Appendix, then
implies that the k-approval rule with k around m/2 is least manipulable if the number
of voters becomes large.
Proposition 6.2 Among all scoring vectors s, σ (s) is maximal if and only if s1 =
· · · = sk = 1 and sk+1 = · · · = sm = 0, where k = m/2 if m is even and k ∈
{(m − 1)/2, (m + 1)/2} if m is odd.
For ease of reference we formulate the main result of this section as a corollary.
Corollary 6.3 Let k∗ denote the value(s) of k in Proposition 6.2 and let s be an arbi-
trary scoring vector unequal to the scoring vector associated with k∗. Then for n
sufficiently large the proportion of manipulable profiles under ϕk∗ is smaller than the
proportion of manipulable profiles under ϕs .
This asymptotic result should be taken with some care, since the probability of
being able to manipulate becomes very small if the number of voters grows, and so we
are comparing small numbers. On the other hand there is some evidence that already
for a relatively small number of voters the k-approval rule with k close to m/2 performs
best, at least among the k-approval rules. See Table 3 in the next section.
7 Some simulation results
Since general comparisons between the approval rule and k-approval rules are complex
and hard to obtain, we present here some results of simulations.14
Table 1 gives the approximate percentages of non-manipulable profiles for the
approval rule with 3–10 candidates and 2, 3, 6, and 10 voters, based on 1,00,000 trials.
While the number of trials is relatively low, we nevertheless think that the numbers in
the table give reliable impressions.
Some conclusions can be drawn from this table. Clearly, the possibility of manipula-
tion increases with the number of candidates. For more than two voters manipulability
also increases from worst comparison to best comparison and from best comparison
to stochastic dominance comparison. This is not entirely intuitive at first glance. One
might expect that many profiles that are manipulable under stochastic comparison are
also manipulable under worst and best comparison, since in order to improve under
stochastic comparison a necessary condition is that the worst and best candidates of a
set should not decrease in preference. Thus, to explain the results in Table 1, it seems
to be the case that manipulation under stochastic comparison is often performed by
improving intermediate candidates. Moreover, apparently this kind of manipulation
13 This is Proposition 3 in Pritchard and Wilson (2009).
14 We thank Bram Driesen for doing these simulations (with Matlab). They are based on constructing
random profiles by randomly drawing strict preferences and checking for non-manipulability using the
characterizations in Sects. 3 and 4. For approval voting, a profile is constructed by randomly drawing a
strict preference w(i) and a ‘cut-off’ number k(i) for each voter i .
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Table 1 Approximate percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for the approval rule, based on
1,00,000 trials
m 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n = 2 Worst comp 56 45 38 33 30 27 25 23
Best comp 65 59 55 52 49 48 46 45
Stoch comp 41 37 34 31 30 28 27 25
n = 3 Worst comp 57 49 44 41 38 36 34 32
Best comp 56 47 41 38 34 32 30 28
Stoch comp 25 20 17 16 15 14 14 13
n = 6 Worst comp 67 61 57 54 52 50 48 47
Best comp 51 40 33 29 25 22 20 18
Stoch comp 28 20 16 13 11 10 09 08
n = 10 Worst comp 73 69 65 62 60 59 57 56
Best comp 54 43 37 32 28 25 23 21
Stoch comp 35 27 22 19 16 15 13 12
Table 2 Approximate percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-approval rules and the
approval rule, m = 6, based on 1,00,000 trials
(m = 6) k 1 2 3 4 5 Approval rule
n = 2 Worst comp 100 54 45 40 83 33
Best comp 100 60 35 100 100 52
Stoch comp 100 93 50 40 83 31
n = 3 Worst comp 44 57 61 32 56 41
Best comp 100 63 51 48 100 38
Stoch comp 100 30 54 35 56 16
n = 6 Worst comp 60 64 60 51 25 54
Best comp 50 59 50 46 78 29
Stoch comp 34 41 24 16 16 13
n = 10 Worst comp 69 70 68 64 56 62
Best comp 45 56 52 40 51 32
Stoch comp 29 36 31 27 07 19
The percentages equal to 100 are exact and reflect strategy-proofness in the involved cases
can often lead to comparable sets, in spite of the fact that stochastic dominance pref-
erence is not complete.
As a final comment on Table 1, under worst comparison manipulability seems to
decrease with the number of voters, but under the other two preference extensions
manipulability first seems to increase and then to decrease again.
In Table 2 we present the results for k-approval rules for six candidates; 2, 3, 6,
or 10 voters; and again based on 1,00,000 trials. For comparison the corresponding
results for the approval rule from Table 1 are copied in Table 2.
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Table 3 Percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-approval rules and the approval rule,
m = 10, n = 25, based on 1,000,000 trials
m = 10 k 1 3 5 7 9 Approval rule
n = 25 Worst comp 67.1 74.4 74.5 70.2 48.8 69.5
Best comp 33.5 49.9 50.2 40.9 54.8 37.6
Stoch comp 26.6 37.6 37.8 29.7 03.7 29.1
Again we see that for relatively high numbers of voters manipulability seems to
increase from worst to best and from best to stochastic dominance comparison. Further,
for more than two voters the approval rule is outperformed by (at least) the 3-approval
rule as far as non-manipulability is concerned.
The final simulation results we present are collected in Table 3. This table gives
the percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-approval rules with k
odd and the approval rule for 10 candidates, 25 voters, based on 1,000,000 trials. We
give more accurate numbers than in the other tables since some differences are very
small. A prudent observation is that the 5-approval rule performs best with respect to
(non-)manipulability among the odd values of k (except for the case k = 9 and best
comparison)—in line with the asymptotic result in Sect. 6. Also, it performs better
than the approval rule.
8 Concluding remarks
The main conclusions from this paper can be summarized as follows. For the case
of two voters we have established which k-approval voting rule is optimal in terms
of minimizing the number of manipulable profiles. The optimal k depends on the
particular preference extension. Excluding k = 1 (plurality voting, strategy-proof but
otherwise less attractive, as argued) and k > (m + 1)/2 (not citizen-sovereign), for
worst comparison and lexicographic worst comparison a value of k close to
√
m is
optimal; for stochastic dominance, best comparison and lexicographic best compar-
ison k = 2 is optimal. On the other extreme, if the number of voters becomes large
then the k-approval rule with k close to half of the number of candidates is even best
among all scoring rules. Simulations show that this may also be the case if the num-
ber of voters is relatively large. With only a few exceptions, simulations show that
approval voting is more manipulable (percentage-wise) than k-approval voting.
Of course, these conclusions should be interpreted with care. They are based on the
impartial culture assumption, assuming that all preference profiles are equally likely,
and they do not say anything about how difficult it is to manipulate or how much gain
can be obtained from manipulation (cf. Campbell and Kelly 2009). Moreover, while
k-approval tends to be less manipulable than approval voting, manipulation under
approval voting still maintains sincerity, which is not the case for k-approval voting.
Even though our measure of non-manipulability reflects ‘impartial culture’ (each
preference profile is regarded as equally likely) the characterizations of the sets of
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non-manipulable profiles derived in this paper, however, are also needed when con-
sidering ‘partial culture’.
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Appendix: Remaining proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.5 For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r , with s(i) = (q(i),
(i)).
In case (a), ϕ (r) = ϕ (r−i )∪[ϕ− (r−i )∩βk(i) (w (i))]. If ϕ (r−i )∩β(i) (q (i)) = ∅
then ϕ (s) = ϕ (r−i )∪[ϕ− (r−i )∩β(i) (q (i))] but this is not preferred to ϕ (r) accord-
ing to w(i). If ϕ (r−i ) ∩ β(i) (q (i)) = ∅ then ϕ (s) = ϕ (r−i ) ∩ β(i) (q (i)) which
again is not preferred to ϕ (r) according to w(i) .
In case (b), ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i ) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) and {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r). If
ϕ (s) ⊆ ϕ (r) then ϕ (s) is not preferred to ϕ (r). Otherwise, there are z ∈ ϕ(s)∩ϕ(r−i )
with (x, z) ∈ w(i) for all x ∈ ϕ(r). In that case too, ϕ (s) is not preferred to ϕ (r)
according to w(i) .
For case (c), note that ϕ (r) ⊆ ϕ (r−i ) and thus, {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r).
Also, {x} w(i) {y} for all x ∈ ϕ (r−i ) and y ∈ ϕ− (r−i ). So ϕ (s) w(i) ϕ (r).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of the three
cases (a)–(c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ (r) is manipulable at profile r by
voter i . By taking negations it follows that none of (a)–(c) holding is equivalent to all
of the following three statements holding for r and i .
1. (i) ϕ (r−i ) ⊆ A\βk(i) (w (i)) or (ii) ϕ− (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅.
2. (i) ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ or (ii) for some x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i))
{x} w(i) {y} or (iii) A\βk(i) (w (i)) ∩ ϕ (r−i ) = ∅.
3. (i) {x} w(i) {y} for some x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i ) or (ii) there are x ∈ ϕ− (r−i ) such that
{x} w(i) ϕ (r−i ).
Requiring (1)–(3) to hold implies twelve cases to consider. However, 1(i) and 2(i)
are contradictory, so that ten cases are left. Now cases 1(i) & 2(ii) & 3(i); 1(i) & 2(ii)
& 3(ii); 1(i) & 2(iii) & 3(i); 1(ii) & 2(ii) & 3(i); 1(ii) & 2(ii) & 3(ii); and 1(ii) & 2(iii)
& 3(i) are covered by case I below. Case 1(ii) & 2(i) & 3(i) is covered by case II. Cases
1(i) & 2(iii) & 3(ii) and 1(ii) & 2(iii) & 3(ii) are covered by case III. Lastly, case 1(ii)
& 2(i) & 3(ii) is covered by case IV.
I. ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ and there exist x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i ) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) such
that {x} w(i) {y}.
II. ϕ (r−i ) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))], ϕ− (r−i ) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and there exist x, y ∈
ϕ (r−i ) such that {x} w(i) {y}.
III. ϕ (r−i ) ⊆ βk(i) (w (i)) and there exist x ∈ ϕ− (r−i ) such that {x} w(i) {y} for
all y ∈ ϕ (r−i ) .
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IV. ϕ (r−i ) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))], ϕ− (r−i ) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and there exist x ∈
ϕ− (r−i ) such that {x} w(i) {y} for all y ∈ ϕ (r−i ).
In cases I and II, take b ∈ β (w(i)|ϕ(r−i )) and consider the report s(i) = (w′(i), 1)
of voter i such that β(w′(i)) = {b}. Then by (1), ϕ(s) = {b}. In case I, ϕ(r) =
ϕ (r−i )∩βk(i) (w (i)), so by the second condition in I, ϕ(s) = {b} w(i) ϕ(r). In case
II, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i ), and by the last condition in case II, again ϕ(s) = {b} w(i) ϕ(r).
In both cases III and IV, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i ). Take x ∈ ϕ− (r−i ) such that {x} w(i) {y}
for all y ∈ ϕ (r−i ). Consider the report s(i) = (w′(i), 1)of voter i such thatβ(w′(i)) =
{x}. Then by (1), ϕ(s) = {x} ∪ ϕ(r−i ). This implies ϕ(s) = {b} w(i) ϕ(r). unionsq
Proof of Corollary 3.7 Let r ∈ RNd , r(i) = (w(i), k(i)) for all i ∈ N .
Suppose that for some j ∈ N statement (b) in Theorem 3.1 does not hold. Then




) ∩ βk( j) (w ( j)). Hence, (a) holds for j . Thus, ϕ is strategy-proof under worst
comparison.
Next, suppose that (a) in Theorem 3.3 does not hold for some i ∈ N . Then there is
a y ∈ ϕ−(r−i ) with (y, x) ∈ w(i) and (x, y) /∈ w(i) for all x ∈ ϕ(r−i ). This implies
that (b) holds for i . Thus, ϕ is strategy-proof under best comparison.
Finally, suppose (c) in Theorem 3.5 does not hold for some i ∈ N . There are two




] = ∅, so that (b) holds. If the second statement in (c) does
not hold, then there is y ∈ ϕ−(r−i ) with {y} w(i) {x} for some x ∈ ϕ(r−i ). In this




then (a) holds, and otherwise (b) holds. Thus, ϕ is
strategy-proof under stochastic dominance comparison. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.3 For the if-part, let q be an i-deviation of p. Note that ϕk(p−i ) =
ϕk(q−i ) and ϕ−k (p−i ) = ϕ−k (q−i ). Assume that at least one of the cases (a)–(e) holds.
We show that voter i cannot manipulate from p to q.
In case (a), we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) and ϕk(q) = ϕk(p) or ϕk(q) ∩
[A \ βk(p(i))] = ∅. In both cases, it is easy to see that ϕk(p) p(i) ϕk(q).
In case (b), ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i ) ∪ [ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))]. If βk(q(i)) ∩ ϕk(p−i ) = ∅
then ϕk(q) = ϕk(p−i ) ∪ [ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i))] but this is never preferred to ϕk(p)
according to p(i). If βk(q(i)) ∩ ϕk(p−i ) = ∅ then ϕk(q) = βk(q(i)) ∩ ϕk(p−i ),
which again is never preferred to ϕk(p) according to p(i).
In case (c), (d), and (e), ϕk(p) = {w}. If ϕk(q) = {w} then x ∈ ϕk(q) for some
x ∈ L(w, p(i)) \ {w}. In that case ϕk(q) is never preferred to ϕk(p) according to
p(i).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of the five
cases (a)–(e) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕk is manipulable at profile p by
voter i .
By taking negations it follows that none of (a)–(e) holding is equivalent to all of
the following four statements holding for p and i .
I. (i) A \ βk(p(i)) ⊆ ϕk(p−i ) or (ii) A \ βk(p(i)) = ϕk(p−i ).
II. (i) ϕk(p−i ) ⊆ [A \ βk(p(i))] or (ii) ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
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III. (i) |ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))| ≥ 2 or (ii) ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ or (iii) ϕk(p−i ) ⊆
βk(p(i)).
IV. (i) |ϕk(p−i )| > 1 or (ii) [ ϕk(p−i ) = {w} for some w ∈ A and ϕ−k (p−i ) ⊆
L(w, p(i)) and |ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ L(w, p(i))| ≤ m − k ].
Requiring (I)–(IV) to hold implies 24 cases to consider. However, the following com-
binations are contradictory: I(ii) and III(i); I(ii) and III(iii); II(i) and III(ii); and III(i)
and IV(ii). Moreover, III(iii) and IV(i) together imply III(i), so that we do not have the
case with IV(i) and III(iii) separately. This leaves eight cases, which we will consider
two at a time.
A. Cases I(i) & II(i) & III(i) & IV(i) and I(i) & II(ii) & III(i) & IV(i). These two
cases are covered by the following assumptions: |ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))| ≥ 2 and
A \ βk(p(i)) ⊆ ϕk(p−i ).
In this case we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)). Let
w = ω (p(i)|ϕk (p−i )∩βk (p(i))). Then we can construct an i-deviation q of p
such that ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i)) =
[
ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))
] \ {w}. Then ϕk(q) =[
ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i))
] \ {w} and, thus, ϕk(q) p(i) ϕk(p).
B. Cases I(i) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(i) and I(ii) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(i). These two
cases are covered by the following assumptions: |ϕk(p−i )| > 1 and ϕk(p−i ) ∩
βk(p(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.




. We can con-
struct an i-deviation q of p such that ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i)) = {b}. Then ϕk(q) =
{b} p(i) ϕk(p−i ) = ϕk(p).
C. Cases I(i) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(ii) and I(ii) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(ii). These
two cases are covered by the following assumptions: [ ϕk(p−i ) = {w} for some
w ∈ A and ϕ−k (p−i ) ⊆ L(w, p(i)) and |ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ L(w, p(i))| ≤ m − k ] and
ϕk(p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.




. Then (b, w) ∈ p(i) since
ϕ−k (p−i ) ⊆ L(w, p(i)). Construct an i-deviation q of p such that ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩
βk(q(i)) = {b}. Then ϕk(q) = {b, w} p(i) {b} = ϕk(p).
D. Cases I(i) & II(i) & III(iii) & IV(ii) and I(i) & II(ii) & III(iii) & IV(ii). These
cases are covered by the assumptions: [ ϕk(p−i ) = {w} for some w ∈ A and
ϕ−k (p−i ) ⊆ L(w, p(i)) and |ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ L(w, p(i))| ≤ m − k ] and ϕk(p−i ) ⊆
βk(p(i)).
In this case, ϕk(p) = {w}. We can construct an i-deviation q of p such that
ϕ−k (p−i )∩L(w, p(i)) ⊆ A\βk(q(i)). Thenϕk(q) = {w}∪
[
ϕ−k (p−i ) ∩ βk(q(i))
]
.
The set ϕ−k (p−i )∩βk(q(i)) is non-empty and contains only points x with (x, w) ∈
p(i). Hence, ϕk(q) p(i) ϕk(p). unionsq
Proof of Corollary 5.4 For 2 ≤ k ≤ (m + 1)/2 we have
η(m, k) = m! k
2 [(m − k)!]2
(m − 2k + 1)!
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by Theorem 5.3. By a few elementary computations we obtain for 2 ≤ k ≤ (m +
1)/2 − 1:
η(m, k) < [>] η(m, k + 1)
⇔ (m − k)2k2 < [>] (k + 1)2(m − 2k + 1)(m − 2k). (*)
Denote A := (k + 1)2(m − 2k + 1)(m − 2k), then A > (k + 1)2(m − 2k)2 and this
latter expression is at least as large as (m − k)2k2 if and only if k2 + 2k − m ≤ 0,
which, in turn, holds if and only if k ≤ √m + 1 − 1. Thus, by (∗),
k ≤ k := √m + 1 − 1 ⇒ η(m, k) < η(m, k + 1).
Similarly, A < (k + 1)2(m − 2k + 1)2 and this latter expression is not larger than
(m − k)2k2 if and only if k2 + k − (m + 1) ≥ 0, which, in turn, holds if and only if
k ≥ 12
√
1 + 4(m + 1) − 12 . Thus, by (∗),
k ≥ k := 1
2
√
1 + 4(m + 1) − 1
2
⇒ η(m, k) > η(m, k + 1).
It is straightforward to derive that k < k < (m + 1)/2 and k − k < 1. Now statement
(a) follows by taking k∗ =  k  + 1 or k∗ ∈ { k  + 1,  k  + 2}, depending on the
exact values of k and k.
For m − 1 ≥ k > (m + 1)/2 we have
η(m, k) = m! k! k!
(2k − m)!
by Theorem 5.3. To go from η(m, k) to η(m, k + 1) we multiply by a factor (k +
1)2/(2k − m + 2)(2k − m + 1), which is larger than 1 since k + 1 ≥ 2k − m + 2. This
proves statement (b).
To show statement (c) we have to show α(m, k) < 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ (m + 1)/2,
where α(m, k) = η(m, k)/η(m, m − 1). By a simple computation we derive
α(m + 1, k) = α(m, k) · (m + 1 − k)
2
m2 (m − 2k + 2) .
Since (m + 1 − k)2 < m2 and m − 2k + 2 ≥ 1, this implies α(m + 1, k) < α(m, k).
Hence, to show α(m, k) < 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ (m + 1)/2, it is sufficient to show
α(2k + 1, k) < 1 for all k ≥ 2. We show this by induction on k. For k = 2 we
have α(5, 2) = 3/4 < 1. Now assume α(2k + 1, k) < 1 then it is sufficient to show
α(2k + 3, k + 1) < 1. To show this, by straightforward computation we have
α(2k + 3, k + 1) = α(2k + 1, k) · (k + 2)
2
2k · (2k + 1) .
123
428 H. Peters et al.
By the induction hypothesis and since (k + 2)2 < 2k · (2k + 1) for k ≥ 2, we obtain
α(2k + 3, k + 1) < 1. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6.2 Let s be an arbitrary scoring vector. We will prove the prop-
osition for the variance σ 2(s), and first show that for σ 2(s) to be maximal every
coordinate of s has to be equal to 0 or 1. Let j ∈ {2, . . . , m − 1} be arbitrary and
write





s2i + s2j − m
(∑




Differentiating with respect to s j , we obtain after simplification:
dσ 2(s)
ds j











ds j > (=,<) 0 exactly when s j > (=,<)
∑
i = j si
m−1 . In turn, this
implies that with respect to s j the variance σ 2(s) is maximal for s j = 0 or s j = 1.
Second, let σ 2(k) denote the variance of the scoring vector associated with the
k-approval rule. Then it is simple to verify that σ 2(k) = (1/m)[k − k2/m], which
implies that σ 2(k) is maximal exactly if k ∈ {(m − 1)/2, (m + 1)/2} for m odd and
k = m/2 for m even.
The proof is complete by combining the two arguments. unionsq
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